



AIR WAR COLLEGE

RESEARCH REPORT

TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONALLY-INITIATED POLICY CHANGES

RELATING TO THE AIR FORCE--TODAY AND TOMORROW




91-12304



LIEUTENANT COLONEL LOREN M. RENO

1990



AIR UNIVERSITY
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC
RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION
UNLIMITED

91 10 3 039

AIR WAR COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

TRENDS IN CONGRESSIONALLY-INITIATED POLICY CHANGES
RELATING TO THE AIR FORCE---TODAY AND TOMORROW

by

Loren M. Reno
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A DEFENSE ANALYTICAL STUDY SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Colonel James E. Little

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

March 1990

DISCLAIMER

This study represents the views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Air War College or the Department of the Air Force. In accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-8, it is not copyrighted but is the property of the United States government.

Loan copies of this document may be obtained through the interlibrary loan desk of Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5564 (telephone (205) 293-7273 or AUTOVON 875-7273).

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

TITLE: Trends in Congressionally-Initiated Policy Changes
Relating to the Air Force--Today and Tomorrow. AUTHOR:
Loren M. Reno, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.

The Air Force needs to give closer attention to what Congress thinks is important. Members and recent Congresses have signaled their interest in Air Force-related issues and then, absent support from the service, have formulated their own legislation or guidance. This trend shows no sign of slackening. The increased interest, however, translates into new Air Force opportunities for educating members of Congress. Because of changes in world situational dynamics, the Air Force needs to reexamine the basis for programs it has espoused and protected for years. Congressional interest is strong and growing in this area. Finally, issues pertaining to space, environment, terrorism, and drug interdiction have strong congressional interest and may be the subjects of upcoming legislation unless the Air Force faces them head-on.



iii

Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By _____	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Loren M. Reno (B.A., Cedarville College; M.S., University of Southern California) has been interested in congressional issues since he worked in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Office of Legislative Liaison, from 1981-82. Following that year working strategic modernization issues, he headed the Military Airlift Command's Legislative Affairs Branch for three years. He returned to a flying assignment in 1985 and was a squadron chief navigator before commanding two aircraft maintenance squadrons from 1987-88 and 1988-89 respectively. He holds the Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters and the Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster. Colonel Reno has completed Squadron Officer School and the Air Command and Staff College and is a graduate of the Air War College, class of 1990.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DISCLAIMER.	ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	iii
BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH	iv
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION.	1
II. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION.	3
Genesis of the Legislation.	3
Summary of the Legislation.	4
Reasons for the Legislation	7
Conclusions	11
III. OVERHAULING SENIOR OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION	12
Genesis of the Congressional Direction.	12
Summary of the Congressional Direction.	13
Reasons for the Congressional Direction	16
Conclusions	16
IV. OTHER CONGRESSIONALLY-INITIATED POLICY CHANGES AND ISSUES.	18
Drug War Mission for the Air Force.	18
The "Pork Barrel" Issue	23
V. PROSPECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HIGH INTEREST ISSUES. . .	28
Issues Related to a Reduction in Defense Spending .	29
Issues Related to Strategy, Roles, and Missions . .	40
Terrorism	42
Other Emerging Issues	43
Educating Members of Congress	45
VI. COMMON THREADS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS. .	48
Common Threads.	48
Recommendations	49
Conclusions	50

APPENDIXES.	52
Most Important Problem.	52
Study on Congressional Interest in	
Air Force-Related Issues.	53
Confidence in Institutions.	61
LIST OF REFERENCES.	62
BIBLIOGRAPHY.	68

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Our founding fathers placed the "sword" in the hands of the executive and the "purse" in the hands of the Congress.

(1:21-22) As change inevitably occurs, the input of Congress will necessarily be significant. "By understanding and acting on the expectations of Congress, the military has the opportunity to lead the change process rather than merely reacting to congressionally directed changes that have been based on little or no military input." (2:47)

Early and present Air Force leaders alike have stated the importance of understanding congressional interests and intentions. General Carl A. Spaatz, the first Air Force Chief of Staff, said, "The battle for command of the air begins," among other places, "In Congress." (3:1) Secretary of the Air Force Donald B. Rice said, "...we must capture the confidence and support of our citizens and their elected leaders." (4:88) To capture the "confidence and support" of Congress, the Air Force must understand the issues those on Capitol Hill consider important. That is the subject of this paper.

The scope of this paper is limited to what those in Congress consider to be important issues for the Air Force to

consider. Primary sources include what those within Congress have said and written in legislation, books, speeches, articles, and interviews. Secondary sources include what congressional watchers have observed.

The methodology used has been to examine recent congressionally-initiated legislation and policy guidance and to analyze issues members of Congress have discussed on and off the floors of their respective chambers. The emergence of issues related to the recent Eastern European political changes were excluded and responses to Air Force budget issue questions were avoided. The thrust was to seek out the issues members of Congress consider important when unprompted by other circumstances or people.

This paper will look for common threads of congressional initiative in the Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act, the overhauling of senior officer professional military education, and other congressional initiatives like the drug mission for the Air Force and the "pork barrel" issue. Next, it will look at some issues Congress is now raising: issues related to a reduction in defense spending, strategy, terrorism, emerging issues, and educating members of Congress. Finally, it will list four common threads to recent legislation and make four recommendations.

CHAPTER II

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REORGANIZATION

Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense (DoD) Reorganization Act in 1986. Senator Barry Goldwater, the Senate sponsor, lauded the action as perhaps the most important the 99th Congress would take. (5:S12,652) This chapter will discuss the genesis of the legislation, a summary of the measure, and why Congress initiated the change.

Genesis of the Legislation

Congress bases its authority for reviewing and changing the DoD organization and procedures on the Constitution, Article 1, Section 8. It states that "Congress shall have power to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces...(and) to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." (6:13)

The DoD Reorganization Act evolved over a period of at least five years as Figure 1 shows. General David C. Jones, then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), started the

process in 1982 by criticizing the existing system and calling for reforms. (5:S12,652) The House Armed Services Committee

History of DoD Reorganization Act of 1986

Committee Reports:

1 in 1982
1 in 1983
1 in 1985
1 in 1986

Bills:

3 in 97th Congress (1981-82)
3 in 98th Congress (1983-84)
11 in 99th Congress (1985-86)

Debate:

7 pages in 1982 House Congressional Record
9 pages in 1983 House Congressional Record
47 pages in 1985 House Congressional Record
79 pages in 1986 House Congressional Record
117 pages in 1986 Senate Congressional Record

Hearings:	Total	House	Senate	Year
	17	15	2	1982
	23	5	18	1983
	11	4	7	1985
	21	13	8	1986
Total	72	37	35	

Figure 1 (7:245-252)

began their review of DoD organization in the same year, the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1983. (6:iii) More than 120 witnesses testified before three committees and one subcommittee. (7:247-252) The Senate passed their resulting version of the legislation with a vote of 95-0, and the House passed their version with a vote of 406-4. (5:S12,652)

Summary of the Legislation

The purpose of the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 was "to strengthen the position of the CJCS" and to "provide for

more efficient and effective operation of the armed forces."

(8:21) Its major provisions are as follows:

1. "Each military department and military headquarters staff, combined, must absorb a 15 percent reduction in personnel by 30 September 1988." (8:21)

2. Joint officer personnel policy will "encourage officers to seek joint staff assignments and...reward them for their service in such assignments." (8:21) It will use three methods to encourage and promote this joint specialty. The law restricts promotion to the grade of brigadier general to those who have served in joint duty assignments. Secondly, it requires career guidelines and procedures for monitoring the careers of joint-duty officers. Thirdly, it requires the CJCS to review promotion selection board reports "to insure appropriate consideration of officers with past or present joint-duty assignments." (8:22)

3. It creates the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Vice Chairman. (8:22)

4. It designates the CJCS as "the principal military advisor to the president, National Security Council, and the secretary of defense." (8:23) It requires the chairman to "perform net assessments," "select the director of the joint staff of the JCS and manage the latter," "recommend to the secretary of defense a budget for each unified and specified command," and to "assess joint military requirements for defense acquisition programs." (8:23)

5. It "strengthens the authority of the combatant commanders over their forces and subordinate commanders."
(8:23)

6. It "confirms that the chain of command runs from the president to the secretary of defense to the combatant commanders." (8:23)

Additionally, it creates the office of the undersecretary of defense for acquisition. (9:81)

The Act moves the leadership of defense strategy and implementation from the services to the secretary of defense, the JCS, and the commanders-in-chief of the unified and specified combatant commands. (10:74-75) It requires the president to prepare an Annual National Strategy Report to "include a comprehensive discussion and description of the worldwide interests, goals, and objectives vital to the national security of the United States; foreign policy, worldwide commitments, and national defense capabilities; proposed short-term and long-term uses of political, economic, military, and other elements of national power; and adequacy of capabilities to carry out the national security strategy."
(10:75) It also revises the Annual Secretary of Defense Report to include "descriptions of the major military missions and military force structure for the next fiscal year, explanation of the relationship of those military missions to that force structure, and justification for military missions and force structure." (10:75)

The provisions of this Act increased congressional oversight of the weapons acquisition process and, according to some, made aspects of the joint-duty officer assignment process unworkable. (11:18;12:6) The Senate responded to DoD concerns and voted to relax guidelines on the joint-duty assignments. The House, on the other hand, expressed an unwillingness to make changes until DoD tried harder to meet the rules. (12:6) Congress agreed, however, to resolve any genuine problems in making the reorganization plan work. (12:6)

Reasons for the Legislation

There are several reasons why Congress initiated the DoD Reorganization Act. They had made no major statutory changes to or comprehensive review of DoD organization since 1958 and many thought the recently revitalized forces could not reach full potential under the structural deficiencies some saw. (6:1)

Another reason for the congressionally initiated change was that they believed the complexity of DoD had frustrated previous reorganization efforts. They believed the technological revolution, increasing demands of protecting United States security interests, and a resistance to change by a large part of the bureaucracy contributed to a preservation of the status quo. (6:1) The resistant-to-change sentiment in defense circles contrasted sharply with the near unanimous approval both houses gave the final measure. Members of Congress cited general opposition to the plan in DoD and the

services prior to its becoming law. (9:81;8:19;12:6) Admiral Mahan said that "a military service cannot be expected to reorganize itself; pressure must be exerted from outside the organization." (13:xxv) Whether or not this is always true, it certainly applied in this case.

A third reason for the legislation was perceived structural deficiencies. Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger cited a structure that unduly constrained the release of energies and imagination and said that the system impaired military advice, execution of military plans, military capabilities, deterrence, and defense posture. (6:iii) These problems manifested themselves in a long history of a "lack of interservice cooperation, poor quality of collective military advice from the JCS, cumbersome chains of command, inadequate authority of the war-fighting commanders in the field, and excessive bureaucracy at every level. (5:S12,653;6:iv) This history goes back more than 85 years. Congressional documents cite examples of DoD organizational problems in the Spanish-American War, the Pearl Harbor attack, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the capture of the USS Pueblo, the Vietnam War, the Iran hostage rescue mission, the Grenada operation, the Marine barracks bombing in Lebanon, and the quality of the Joint Chiefs' military advice. (6:354-370;14:H512;5:S12,562;15:89)

"Thoughtful, decisive, and experienced officials" had tried to solve the structural deficiencies for years. (16:iv) In his December 1945 message to Congress, President Truman identified impaired unity of operations in the field because of

"differences in training, in doctrine, in communication systems, and in supply and distribution systems that stemmed from the division of leadership in Washington." (13:xxiii) This concern led to the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the position of secretary of defense with severely constrained authority, but "little was done to solve the fundamental organizational problems." (13:xxiii) President Eisenhower, in his 1958 message to Congress, said "The truth is that most of the service rivalries that have troubled us in recent years have been made inevitable by the laws that govern our defense organization." (13:xxiv) Subsequently, the Symington Report (1960), which President-elect Kennedy commissioned, the Presidential Blue Ribbon Defense Panel (1970), the Steadman Report (1978), and the Special Study Group Report (1982) all pointed to the strength of the parochial service interests among the JCS at the expense of the larger national interests. (13:xxiv;9:81) The congressionally-initiated DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 succeeded in making changes Administrations since the 1950s had not achieved.

A fourth reason for the reorganization momentum from Congress was the increasing visibility of "military procurement 'horror stories' involving \$450 hammers, \$650 aircraft ashtrays, and the like...." (8:20)

In summary, Congress found the DoD structurally flawed. The Staff Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee identified 16 specific problems: (6:3-10)

1. "Limited mission integration at DoD's policymaking level."
2. "Imbalance between service and joint interests."
3. "Imbalance between modernization and readiness."
4. "Inter-service logrolling."
5. "Inadequate joint advice."
6. "Failure to adequately implement the concept of unified command."
7. "Unnecessary staff layers and duplication of effort in the top management headquarters of the military departments."
8. "Predominance of programming and budgeting."
9. "Lack of clarity of strategic goals."
10. "Insufficient mechanisms for change."
11. "Inadequate feedback."
12. "Inadequate quality of political appointees and joint duty military personnel."
13. "Failure to clarify the desired division of work."
14. "Excessive spans of control." "The Air Force Chief of Staff, for example, had 35 officials reporting directly to him."
15. "Insufficient power and influence of the secretary of defense."
16. "Inconsistent and contradictory pattern of congressional oversight." Senator Goldwater later said that "any reorganization of the Pentagon would prove imperfect unless accompanied by fundamental changes in the Congress" but

that there was insufficient interest among members to reform Congress. (16:54) This observation proved to be prophetic.

Conclusions

Congress initiated the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 because it had not made any significant changes in three decades of growing complexity and because it saw deficiencies the DoD was not addressing. "Now that the lid is off the box, so to speak, continued reform will be the norm." (15:98) As the services, the JCS, and DoD search for and find areas needing change, they should make the changes if they can so that less perfect legislation will not encumber them. As the Congress asks for help in forming future Air Force and DoD legislation, the military would do well to get in step a lot sooner than they did with the reorganization.

CHAPTER III

OVERHAULING SENIOR OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION

The congressional interest in joint matters from 1982 to 1986 sparked more than just reorganization legislation. About a year after Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986, the House Armed Services Committee established the Panel on Military Education. The action that panel took provides some clues as to where congressional interests lie. This chapter will discuss the genesis of the congressional direction, a summary of their guidance, reasons for their action, and some conclusions.

Genesis of the Congressional Direction

The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee established the panel on 13 November 1987. In his appointment letter, he tasked the panel to do two things:

The Panel on Military Education should review Department of Defense plans for implementing the joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act with a view toward assuring that this education provides the proper linkage between the service competent officer and the competent joint officer. The panel should also assess the ability of the current DoD military education system to develop professional military strategists, joint war fighters, and tacticians. (17:v)

The panel also looked into the area of the quality of military

education believing it was "implicit in the panel's charter."

(17:13)

The panel limited its inquiry to the top three levels of officer professional military education (PME). These levels include the intermediate level (for 1st and 2nd grade officers between their 10th and 15th years of service), the senior level (for officers between their 16th and 23rd years of service), and the general/flag officer level. The panel did this because they believed the intermediate level was "the appropriate point to begin intensive study of joint matters and strategy."

(17:14)

The panel did a thorough job. They visited all 10 intermediate- and senior-level schools conducting hearings; attending classes; and talking separately with the faculties, senior staff, and students. (17:16) Forty-eight witnesses testified at 28 hearings in Washington and at the schools. These witnesses included "the deputy secretary of defense, the CJCS, all four service chiefs, four commanders-in-chief of combatant commands," and others. (17:16) The panel also looked at comparable British, French, and German military schools.

The panel concluded their review of military education with their 21 April 1989 report.

Summary of the Congressional Direction

The report concluded that though the DoD intermediate-level and above military education system was sound,

"significant improvements can and should be made." (17:2) The report contained nine recommendations:

1. "Establish a PME framework for DoD schools that specifies and relates the primary educational objectives at each PME level." (17:2)

2. "Improve the quality of faculty (1) by amending present law to facilitate hiring civilian faculty and (2) through actions by the CJCS and the service chiefs to ensure that only high-quality military officers are assigned to faculties." (17:3)

3. "Establish a two-phase Joint Specialist Officer education process with Phase I taught in service colleges and a follow-on, temporary-duty Phase II taught at the Armed Forces Staff College." (17:3)

4. "Adopt the proposal being developed by the CJCS that the National War College be converted to a National Center for Strategic Studies, as both a research and educational institution." (17:4)

5. "At the senior service colleges (1) make national military strategy the primary focus and (2) increase the mix by service of both the military faculty and military students." (17:5)

6. "Implement a substantive Capstone course that includes the study of national security strategy and national military strategy." (17:6)

7. "Review the Navy military education system to determine whether Navy officers should and can attend both

intermediate and senior colleges and whether each Naval War College school should have a more distinct curriculum." (17:6)

8. "Establish the position of Director of Military Education on the staff of the CJCS to support his responsibilities for joint PME and for formulating policies to coordinate all military education." (17:6)

9. "Require students at both intermediate and senior PME schools to complete frequent essay-type examinations and to write papers and reports that are thoroughly reviewed, critiqued, and graded by faculty." (17:7)

With respect to the three levels of military education the panel studied, they concluded the major subject should be the employment of forces and the conduct of war. (17:7) Specifically, the panel believed intermediate schools should study not only other branches within that service, but the other services, too. Additionally, they said "the intermediate schools should...be the principal schools for learning jointness." (17:8) Senior schools, they said, should "increase their emphasis on national military strategy" and send selected graduates to study national security strategy at the proposed National Center for Strategic Studies. (17:8)

The above recommendations should be considered as more than just "recommendations." Subsequent to the committee printing the report, Representative Skelton, the panel's chairman, introduced legislation that would restructure the military education system. He did this "principally as a reminder to Pentagon leaders that he (is) serious about the

recommendations in the report." (18:16) Though the panel is open to suggestions from the Pentagon, it is also insisting that the Pentagon seriously appraise, act on, and report back on the panel's recommendations. (18:16)

Reasons for the Congressional Direction

Congress initiated a review of the upper three levels of the military education system for several reasons. First, they believed "...the current system does not provide a clear, coherent educational framework for officers from all four services to broaden their joint-service perspective in preparation for high-level military service." (18:16) Second, they believed the war colleges "have failed to keep pace with changes in warfare and security strategy" and "were no longer producing strategists of the same caliber as George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower." (19:A24) Despite the present emphasis on improving procurement efficiency in the services, many in Congress think a return to making generals "masters of the art of war" will profoundly improve military efficiency. (20:239) Their thought is that improving the military education system will help accomplish this.

Conclusions

When considering the question of why Congress initiated action in this area, we can make several conclusions.

First, they were only following up on previously passed legislation. When Congress passes legislation as far-reaching

as was the DoD Reorganization Act, and with such unanimity, the services can expect follow up on related matters.

Second, when a service contemplates or makes policy changes in areas relating to pending or recently passed legislation of significant congressional interest, Congress probably wants to know. Congress is less likely to micromanage areas they are confident the services are already adequately managing. (80:82) Also, if one service is doing something good in a particular area, the other services need to learn about it. This is the point of the DoD reorganization and the congressional interest in military education--to improve jointness.

CHAPTER IV

OTHER CONGRESSIONALLY-INITIATED POLICY CHANGES AND ISSUES

In addition to the aforementioned DoD reorganization and the overhaul of military professional education, Congress has shown interest in other areas. Their interest stems from the dynamics of societal change and is a result of the representative form of government the nation enjoys. An examination of two of these issues will shed further light on what prompts Congress to act.

There is an inextricable link between the drug war and what members of Congress call "pork barrel" politics. Senator Goldwater criticized "raids on the defense budget to fund non defense needs in areas like the space program, the Merchant Marine, the Coast Guard, and the drug war." While he said these programs had merit, he thought defense should not be robbed to pay for them. (16:56) This chapter will analyze the assignment of the drug war mission to the Air Force and the "pork barrel" issue and then make some conclusions.

Drug War Mission for the Air Force

The congressional decision to make the drug war a mission for the Air Force was not made hastily. In part, it

was the result of a change in the public's perceptions and desires. This section will discuss the genesis of the legislation, a summary of its provisions, why Congress initiated it, and some conclusions.

Genesis of the Legislation

Some considered the possibility of a military drug war mission as early as 1986. The Report of the President's Commission on Organized Crime, March 1986, stated there was "a growing perception by Congress (and by the public) that drug trafficking and abuse do, indeed, constitute threats to national security" because they "comprise a direct attack on the physical and social well-being of our country." (2:60) Congress began to take a tough stance on this issue. When DoD tried to detach 16 Coast Guard 110-foot patrol boats for Persian Gulf duty, Congress opposed it and eventually passed an amendment prohibiting the transfer. DoD ultimately withdrew the suggestion. (21:206) Congressional interest and intent sharply escalated in 1988 and ultimately led to their decision "to make the DoD the government's lead agency for the detection, monitoring, and surveillance of narcotics smuggling into the United States by sea and air." (21:206)

Summary of the Legislation

In their legislation, Congress specified that "the armed forces will concentrate on the detection and monitoring of air and sea traffic, a role that is consistent with the traditional military mission." (22:28) They also directed the secretary of defense to "work closely with the director of

central intelligence to insure that the collection of drug interdiction information is established as a high priority for the intelligence community." (22:28) To fund the new mission emphasis, Congress took \$210 million from the defense budget and applied it to the drug war. (23:23)

Reasons for the Legislation

Why did Congress react to the drug problem by adding a portion of the interdiction mission to the armed forces? There are three reasons.

The first reason was that America's number one perceived problem changed from the fear of war (presumably with the Soviets) to the emerging drug and drug abuse problem. This change occurred in the spring of 1988 and for two reasons: the fear of war dropped off at about the same time that the concern about drugs and drug abuse climbed. See Figure 2. Congress




Figure 2
(see Appendix 1 for sources)

sensed this shift of opinion as evidenced by their talking about the drug problem on the floors of their respective

chambers more than many other defense related issues (see Appendix 2).

The second reason was that there was high confidence in the military as an institution. See Figure 3. For at least




Figure 3
(See Appendix 3 for source)

the period from 1985 to 1989, the military enjoyed a high, if not the highest, confidence rating when compared to other institutions. Since 1987, public confidence in the military increased while it decreased from 7 to 10 percentage points in all of the other top four institutions.

The third reason was that Congress was "reacting to election-year political demands." (24:25) Excepting retiring members, the entire House and a third of the Senate faced reelection that year. Though DoD was reluctant to accept "a direct antidrug smuggling mission," Congress pressed ahead with

the legislation in time for the election. (22:28) To them, it made sense. They cited DoD using the "U-2 aircraft for antidrug aerial photography and intelligence operations. In addition, antismuggling efforts (had) become a consideration in the Defense Department's planning and development of future strategic surveillance systems," they said. (24:25)

Conclusions

Two conclusions merit consideration based on the evolution of the congressionally-initiated drug war mission for the military. First, Congress is interested in an increased inter-agency integration in this area of national policy as a minimum. There may be other areas in which they will involve the DoD (and possibly the services) as world events change. Second, more changes in the drug interdiction mission are possible. In January 1989, Representative Bryant introduced the War on Drug Smuggling Act that would expand the role of the military in interdicting international drug trafficking. This bill would direct the secretary of defense to provide help, if called upon by Drug Enforcement agencies, subject to military preparedness requirements. (25:E39-40) Congress may not be done expanding the military's role in this area.

If Congress has shown interest in using the military for drug traffic interdiction, it has shown a preoccupation with budget line items. Some observe that "the President's budget has come to be regarded (by Congress) as a mere suggestion...." (23:20) As they add missions and hardware, delete programs, and rearrange funding, the final

appropriations bill usually differs considerably from the original request. Part of the reason for these changes is "pork barrel."

The "Pork Barrel" Issue

When Congress changes what the President requests in his annual budget submission, cries of "pork barreling" soon follow. There are clearly two sides to this emotional issue. On the one hand, one professional staff member of the House Armed Services Committee observed that "politics, after all, is the art of the possible" and that "national security must be above politics--partisan, bureaucratic, sectional, or any other kind." (13:xxv) The other extreme is that "congressional usurpation of presidential authority has become the operating style of the Democratic Congress...." (23:20)

If one is to understand the motives of Congress, he or she must understand this sensitive issue or "pork." Members of Congress and observers alike admit to its existence. This section will look at the genesis of the "pork barrel" issue, recent examples, why Congress buys "pork," and finally some conclusions.

Genesis of the "Pork Barrel" Issue

The "pork" issue is not new to the 1990s. In 1985, one defense observer wrote about what "pork" is.

In many cases, a member of Congress, because of his influence, has brought defense plants or bases to his state, or he has lobbied to be on defense committees or help protect the defense economy on which so many of his constituents' jobs are based. This system has been

building since World War II, and the constituents of a district or state have continued to reward members of Congress who 'bring home the bacon' of defense contracts. (26:31)

A congressman observed in 1989 that "too many members (of Congress) look at the defense bill the way Jimmy Dean looks at a hog: as a giant piece of pork to be carved up and sent to the folks back home." (27:127)

"Pork Barreling" has been an issue of varying intensity for more than 40 years and continues to produce examples of irritation to the defense and non-defense communities alike.

Examples of "Pork"

Recent legislation is replete with examples of what many call "pork." In the Fiscal Year 1989 DoD Authorization Bill, Congress added more than \$4.3 billion in programs that were not in the original request. Most of these were for weapons procurement like the \$219 million for 110 unrequested M1 tanks, \$207 million for 12 extra F-18 fighters, and \$300 million for 16 unrequested C-130 aircraft. (23:23) When the Air Force curtailed F-15E production in acquiescing to the "fiscal facts of life," Congress overrode those decisions by restoring funding and by taking it away from other programs, such as the B-2. (4:87)

Representative Arme, from Texas and not a member of the Armed Services Committee, ranks obsolete military bases at the top of the "pork" list. (27:127) Though only a second term congressman, he succeeded in moving legislation through Congress that provided a method to bypass the concerns of

individual members about bases in their districts and states and permit the bases to close.

Finally, some argue there is a double standard in Congress for procurement standards: one for the military, the other for itself. Hard-won reforms often give way to parochial interests. Two congressmen from Massachusetts fought to add money for Smith and Wesson weapons made in their state, and the New York delegation fought to restore funding for the T-46 aircraft the Air Force canceled. (28:90)

It is easier to cite examples of alleged "pork", however, than it is to state the absolute reasons for it.

Reasons

Members of Congress provide "pork" because they are genuinely concerned for the well-being of their constituents. It is a function of their job in a representative democracy to mix this concern "with a dedication to the good of the nation, which often appeals to their constituents as well." (29:11) The degree to which members balance the nation's and their district's interests varies, of course, with the member.

When cutting defense spending is a plank in a member's reelection platform and there are no bases in his district, he may be more motivated to close bases than are his peers. Even "...a lone member of Congress, acting without support from special interests or Congressional leaders, can make a difference--for taxpayers and the nation." (27:128) While "lone members" can make a difference in cutting defense

spending, they often make even more of a difference in adding defense spending.

Two other factors have contributed to the "pork barrel" trend. Since the Vietnam war, the new generation of congressmen has permitted increased intrusion and influence from outside groups and has shown a disposition "to member-centered government." (30:62,64) The combined result, according to one retiring senator, is a tenancy on the part of many in Congress to get more involved in line items that are "trivial in comparison to the larger needs on national defense." (16:54)

Some suggest more naively that members of Congress sometimes just aren't aware of the national consequences. The first director of the Congressional Budget Office wrote that when Congress appears to be micromanaging, it may "be an outgrowth of the frustration caused by feeling excluded from macro-decisions." (29:11) They may be adding money for C-130 aircraft because they support a more vigorous modernization program for the Air National Guard or the Air Force Reserves than does the Air Force. Though this is not the same thing as the constituent-concern issue, it is not altogether different.

Some, like former Senator Goldwater, are quite vocal on this issue. He cites a "lack of statesmanship" and "rampant 'pork-barreling' on the part of the new guard in Congress." He continued,

They don't think of national defense; that is not an important item to them. They think only of getting

reelected, of what they can get to be built in their own state or district. (9:78)

The Air Force Chief of Staff sees a lack of congressional consensus on defense policy as a major challenge to the quality of Air Force support and equipment. (31:10) He said that "narrow constituent or parochial interests" prevent us from building "defense forces that will serve the nation for decades to come." He continued that the Air Force "should and will continue to strive mightily to persuade Congress and the public to maintain prudent defense programs." (4:87)

Conclusions

An analysis of congressional trends of interest to the military would be incomplete without a look at the "pork barrel" issue. Two conclusions are obvious. First, a continuing education program for members of Congress and the public can only help. Members of Congress are interested, to varying degrees, in their constituents and the good of the nation. Second, constituent interests are a fact of life. "Pork barrel" has been with us for a long time, and it is likely to continue.

In summary, the reasons for the pursuit of "pork" go back to the form of government we have. The demands of the constituents, the statesmanship and philosophy of the members, and DoD's articulation of the issues will interact to drive the price of "pork" up or down.

CHAPTER V

PROSPECTIVE CONGRESSIONAL HIGH INTEREST ISSUES

Congress has expressed interest in a variety of issues that relate to the Air Force. Senators and representatives have addressed these issues on the floors of their respective chambers and in committee meetings, introduced related legislation or amendments to pending legislation, written about them, and spoken of them in interviews and speeches. The voices of the individual members are more effective now than in recent decades, and will continue to be because Congress is not likely to adopt reforms to restrict its legislative prerogative. (32:396) The evolutionary ascent of the annual authorization process, the politicizing of defense policy, and some congressional reforms have increased the members' opportunity, incentive, and freedom to participate in the defense process. (32:371) Air Force leaders, therefore, need to know the issues Congress considers important. Yesterday's rhetoric can lead to today's hearings and tomorrow's legislation.

A 1985 study showed the defense issues selected members of Congress and professional staff members thought were substantive. One hundred percent of those interviewed or

polled chose the strategic defense initiative; 90 percent chose resumption of arms talks with the Soviets and procurement reform; 70 percent chose DoD reorganization, missions and roles of the active and reserve forces, modernization of the reserve forces, and technology transfer. (33:13,14) The passing of five years has seen significant legislation on some of these issues, bilateral agreements on some, and no action on others.

Of the following issues discussed in this chapter, some are older than others; Congress, however, is increasing its interest in them all. That means they are likely to have high interest in the following in the 1990s: issues related to a reduction in defense spending; issues related to strategy, roles, and missions; terrorism; other emerging issues; and their own education.

Issues Related to a Reduction in Defense Spending

"Massive federal budget deficits guarantee that defense spending will remain a major political issue" into the 1990s. (32:396) Along with the reduction, Congress has expressed interest in changes in the following: the air reserve forces, burden sharing, mobility assets, procurement reform the draft, and base closures. Some of these areas are tied more closely to a reduction in defense spending than others. This section will discuss these seven issues.

Defense Spending

Defense spending is not likely to enjoy the growth it saw in the early 1980s. "The view on Capitol Hill is that real

growth will remain next to nil indefinitely" despite DoD's plans for a modest real growth. (34:63) One reason for this is that "diminished East-West tensions make voting for level or even reduced defense spending a new political option for both Democrats and Republicans." (35:8) Another reason is because "our fiscal, economic, and trade problems seem closer to the forefront" than in recent years. (36:11) As real growth decreases, visibility of heretofore hidden programs will increase.

One prominent member of the House Armed Services Committee said, "You're going to see a lot more fuss raised about the numbers and dollars of black programs." (37:54) While he admitted that his committee felt more strongly about this issue than either the House Appropriations Committee or the House Select Committee on Intelligence, he hinted his committee may propose "legislation to fix it." (37:54)

Many members of Congress see the defense budget as "the cash cow for environmental, educational, and even foreign aid programs." (35:8) This is partly because a large share of the federal budget's discretionary money is in the defense budget and partly because non-defense issues are gaining momentum. One congresswoman believes "...there is little doubt that we can find money in the defense budget that can be used for family initiatives." (38:167) Also, newly assigned missions, like drug interdiction, "threaten to reduce DoD resources." (35:11;36:12) For these reasons and because of the perception in both parties and houses that "...defense spending has not

achieved benefits worth its cost," some think "the Senate will increase its review (of the defense budget) to the level of the House." (39:110)

Congress has also increased its interest in priorities and wants to be sure defense dollars enhance overall security. (2:47) Representative John Kasich and others admit Congress' "pay-for-it-later syndrome was resulting in a defense budget written in red ink." (40:9) The resulting closer scrutiny will produce more debate on the conventional-nuclear issue. One congressman suggests some of his colleagues have a "nuclear allergy and look for excuses to criticize strategic programs." Others, he said, support future strategic systems at the expense of ones being considered now with the intent of then opposing the future system later on. (41:101) This same member, however, cited a reduction in spending for conventional capabilities and an increase in spending for the "esoteric, the exotic, the far-out stuff," a view he said was shared by other members of the House Armed Services Committee, the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, and the Senate. (37:52) The chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee agreed and said that "top priority...must go to conventional forces." (42:114) In general, Congress favors conventional forces over strategic ones and existing programs and weapon systems over new ones. (39:112) Not wanting to hurt national security or combat readiness, it has made cuts in personnel accounts, even though many put "preserving the quality of the people" at the top of the priority list. (43:1;44:46) The

personnel accounts in general and military pay in particular will continue to receive attention. One senator has stated he believes that annual military pay raises should be tied to private-sector salary increases instead of being determined by politics. (45:10) These changing priorities, "the importance of national defense, and the fact that manpower expenditures remain a substantial part of every defense budget" guarantee that significant congressional interest in defense spending will continue. (46:82)

Two other related issues deserve mentioning. One often overlooked explanation for this change in congressional perspective is the change in the profile of its membership. On the one hand, veterans of the Vietnam war are finding their way into the membership of both houses. They formed a group, the Vietnam Veterans in Congress, in 1974, now numbering nearly 50 members, and work Agent Orange and judicial issues. (47:12) This does not mean, however, that the number of members with firsthand military experience is increasing. The opposite is the case at least in the House (see Figure 4). Since 1977,




Figure 4 (2:39;48)

there has been a general decline in the percentage of members of the House of Representatives with first hand military experience.

Second, comment on the impact of 1989-90 world events on defense spending reductions is conspicuously absent. Although the scope of this paper is limited to exclude analysis of balance of power changes and fallout from the Eastern European political upheaval, these significant changes will, no doubt, fuel the trend of reducing U.S. defense spending.

Some suggest one possible solution to the dilemma of cutting defense spending without hurting defense is to robust the air reserve forces.

Air Reserve Forces

Many in Congress have indicated they think there are significant savings available by transferring more forces from the active force to the reserve forces.

Senator Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said, "Integrated active and reserve forces could yield the United States a less costly, yet more combat effective, force structure characterized by later, readier reserves." (49:8) A previous staff member said, "Reserve forces, if properly trained, equipped, supported, and integrated with active forces, are perhaps the best defense bargain available, and could even permit a modest reduction in far more expensive active-duty forces." (50:91) The argument here is not with the benefit to be gained from "integration," but with what "modest" means. The present Chief of the Air

Force Reserve, Major General Roger P. Sheer, said the present Air Force total-force mix (74.3 percent active, 10.8 percent Reserve, and 14.9 percent Air National Guard) was close to "the most desirable mix." He also stated that the cost was the same for a reserve unit to take "over a mission and perform it with the same operational intensity." (51:38)

Still, members of Congress see the reserve forces as the natural place to put more capability. Senator Sasser thinks the National Guard has a natural capability for combating drug trafficking and advocates moving strategic airlift from the active force, too. (52:37,40) He and Senator Nunn have spoken in support of robusting the reserve tactical fighter forces and cite their superior readiness and combat skills. (49:8;52:37) The perception of over-emphasis on the active forces is not isolated to the Senate. Representative Gingrich wrote, "We have spent too little on military training and readiness while wasting too much money on expensive active-duty forces where reserve and guard units might well have served." (20:212)

Decreasing the number of active forces is one way Congress is approaching the reduction in defense spending, and increasing burden sharing is another.

Burden Sharing

Many believe that burden sharing by our allies is "...the reform that may hold the greatest promise for changing how we allocate our defense money and resources." (38:169) Another congressman predicts that "doing less (carrying of

NATO burden) is going to have a very strong advocacy in the Congress." (37:54) This is not, however, a concept new to the 1990s. Nearly 20 years ago, Senator John C. Stennis said, "I certainly agree that our allies should assume more of the onerous economic and military burden which now rests so heavily upon us." (53:10)

Congress is pursuing the trend of increased burden sharing for several reasons. They believe the framers of the constitution intended Congress to maintain an Army limited in size except during wartime. (54:140) According to Senator Cohen, "Our allies want our support but not our forces over there. They (now) want us just over the horizon." (55:68) Also, reducing American troop commitments worldwide has become politically supportable with the strengthening of the economies in Japan, Korea, and Western Europe. (35:8) To that end, legislation is already pending to bring U.S. troops home and more should be expected. (56:A12)

If "just over the horizon" is where our allies want our support, what will be the priority given to mobility?

Mobility

Military leaders agree there is a significant need for mobility assets. Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., CJCS, said that "if fiscal realities were to require force reductions both at home and overseas, our mobility assets would become even more critical." (55:68) General Duane H. Cassidy, Commander-in-Chief of the United States Transportation Command and the Military Airlift Command in 1989, said, "Reducing our troop

strength in Europe will not only exacerbate our ability to rapidly reinforce Europe but other theaters as well." (55:68)

Congress, does not agree, however, on the need for increased mobility assets. Senator Rudman said that he thinks we have enough airlift to move existing divisions to Europe; he believes the civil reserve airlift fleet can move the people and military airlift can move the equipment. (44:46) Others believe there is a wide gap between U.S. strategic mobility capability and commitments for three reasons. They opine that strategic mobility is expensive, a stepchild in DoD, and applied in Third World interventions in a manner that often runs counter to national vital interests. (50:93,94)

Senator Cohen summed up his view of the emphasis mobility is likely to receive in the 1990s. He said, "Our principal (national security) priority is projection of force capability." (55:68) This increased interest in procuring mobility assets will match the present interest in procurement in general.

Procurement Reform

Congressional pressure has been strong in the area of procurement reform and likely will continue to be. Congress is committed to restoring public confidence in military procurement. "Congress adopted many new procurement provisions in the Fiscal 1987 military budget, despite industry and Defense Department appeals for a respite to digest the scores of legal changes enacted since the spare parts price scandal broke in 1983." (57:36) Congress has still other suggestions

in a number of areas. Some allege DoD invites procurement micromanagement when they (DoD) do a bad job and that providing better training and longevity for the acquisition specialists would go a long way in solving the problem. (9:82;58:20) Some encourage DoD to "maintain a closer rapport with industry as well as Congress to get as precise a picture as possible of what a proposed weapon system can" and cannot do. (9:82) Some think the services let prospective procurement programs "percolate too long." (37:52) At least one member has said the current American model for procurement is insane--a nightmare--and that "we need people looking at alternative paradigms of procurement." (59) Still others favor going to an acquisition system that would "separate the buyers and the users to provide built-in checks and balances that encourage realism in planning and budgeting and discourage duplication." (58:20) Service duplication in procurement (and mission) has been a long-term irritant for many. (9:82)

There is not, however, agreement as to how much Congress should be involved in the procurement process. A 1989 Office of Technology Assessment study said that Congress has caused problems the consequences of which "have been high costs, long procurement times, inefficient production, and restricted access to technology." (60:D7) A ranking congresswoman on the House Armed Services Committee countered that "we need more accountability, not less. Congress needs to get in (to the acquisition process) earlier." (60:D7)

While the degree of congressional involvement may be an open issue, the fact of their involvement is not and the Air Force leadership understands this. Secretary Rice said,

How well we run the acquisition process determines whether or not the nation will support defense decisions. Buying smart is a public trust. To give the warfighters the kind and numbers of systems they need, we must capture the confidence and support of our citizens and their elected leaders. (4:88)

Congress will continue to provide guidance in the area of procurement reform. Other issues, like national service, have less consensus.

National Service

There are a few in Congress who favor a return to some form of national service or draft. One senator predicted that "in the next five years we will have a draft whether we like it or not" because military pay and benefits are slipping to unattractive levels. (61:11) Others "advocate some form of national service or a return to limited conscription" because of "budgetary considerations." (52:38) Still others think we do not need a draft at this time and suggest Congress should be concentrating on weapon systems acquisition, training for the different missions, and improving health care. (62:19)

Those favoring a return to some form of national service did so before the significant political changes in Eastern Europe developed during 1989. If paying for the forces we deploy worldwide was one of the strengths of the pro-national service argument, the foregoing paragraphs explain why a draft (or another form of national service) may now be less

likely. If, on the other hand, there are other political motivations for some form of national service, this issue of concern to a few may grow to the emotional intensity of the present base closure issue.

Base Closures

A final issue related to a reduction in defense spending is the closing of military installations. "Members of Congress agree in principle that shutting military bases is a good way to cut \$2 billion from the nation's \$300 billion defense bill--but they invariably use their clout to keep open bases in their own districts." (63:8) One reason they are reluctant to permit bases in their district or state to close is because of the anticipated negative economic impact on that community. A 1977 DoD Office of Economic Adjustment study found that "most local economies were better off without the presence of the military....Where the 100 bases (studied) had once provided 93,000 civilian jobs, there were now 138,000 jobs...." (64:34) While this may convince some there may not be a net decrease in the job market if a base closes, it begs other unanswered questions. Does it include money lost from the departed military work force? What about the jobs that money supported? Are conclusions from a 13 year-old study still valid? As long as fears of adverse economic impact run high, base closures will remain an issue, and an emotional one at that.

To stay ahead of the results of a reduction in defense spending, the Air Force has taken seriously the DoD's Defense

Management Review. Secretary Rice said,

If we don't move out, Congress will make the moves for us, and the budget will force more reductions in force structure and modernization. We either cut our overhead and our less-essential activities, or we mortgage our future. It's that simple. (4:87)

The above issues related to reductions in defense spending are of increasing interest to Congress. They are also interested in issues relating to strategy, roles, and missions.

Issues Related to Strategy, Roles, and Missions

Congressional interest in defense is far broader than just voting for certain weapon systems and against others. They have expressed significant interest in strategy, joint-service concerns, and space initiatives.

Strategy

When the services, DoD, or the Administration make changes to strategy, Congress wants to know about it. "Changes in strategy are a congressional concern; they usually require a reallocation of priorities and changes in budget." (10:79) While there is a consensus that Congress wants to be involved in strategy changes--the earlier, the better--there is no consensus on what exactly the strategy should be. (2:46) This concern about the "defense establishment and its military strategy and spending" and basic doctrine spawned the formation of the Military Reform Caucus in 1981. (65:23)

Some have mentioned specific areas of strategy the services need to look at. Representative Gingrich mentioned "small wars" and the "need to focus on information warfare" as

two specific areas needing strategy changes. (59) Another area closely related to strategy is jointness.

Jointness

The issue of the DoD Reorganization and the resulting comprehensive legislation were discussed earlier in this paper. The jointness issue is raised in this chapter on prospective congressional high interest issues because many in Congress think "the idea of jointness is only going to grow." (59) Congress will continue to do more thinking about and acting on joint-service missions, research and development, and procurement. (2:47) Legislators will continue to have a deep interest in missions with joint interest and participation, and will watch how the services parcel them out. One member has already gone on record as not being "sure the Air Force's current thinking on close air support is on target." (41:100)

Space Initiatives

Congressional concern for space initiatives goes beyond the strategic defense initiative (SDI). To be sure, they are concerned about the direction and capability of the SDI program. In 1989, "Congress ordered the Defense Department to submit a report to Congress...on plans for development of an accidental launch protection system...as a limited shield against an accidental missile attack by another nation...." (66:21) Another member suggested that DoD needs to think seriously about space because it is a very high value system and the U.S. is behind the Soviets in a couple of areas. He also said that we need redundancy because present systems that

support transportation and command and control can be degraded in seconds. This increases the need for alternative schemes of behavior. He concluded that the services would do well to conduct joint exercises without using the satellite systems upon which they routinely depend. (59)

The space initiative issue is closely related to strategy and the reduction in defense spending. Our national military strategy will be directly affected by the limits we place or remove on our space technology. Because the technology is still maturing, however, the cost for developing it is high and may well determine what other defense systems Congress will not fund. This is because weapon systems and threats, like terrorism, are demanding an increased price and attention.

Terrorism

Fighting terrorism may well be the largest challenge to the Air Force in the 1990s. Representative Gingrich said,

Terrorism must be confronted because it is far more likely to have an impact on our lives than is nuclear war. Terrorism is more likely to kill Americans and to challenge our policies than is any other kind of force. (20:231)

He recommended confronting terrorism by developing "a doctrine which so severely and directly threatens the leaders of terrorist movements that they refrain from the United States because they fear personal consequences." (20:232)

A study of what members of Congress talked about on the floors of the House and Senate during the first 50 legislative

days of the 1989 session showed the emergence of terrorism as an issue of wide interest. (See Appendix 2) Terrorism ranked second to only environmental concerns in Air Force-related issues and ranked ahead of drugs, SDI, and defense spending in general. (67) Congress has shown an increased interest in the strategy, capability, and timing for dealing with terrorism. This trend will likely continue into the 1990s.

Other Emerging Issues

There are several recurring issues that seem to be gaining a larger advocacy. They are the role of women in combat, futuristic trends, and the environment.

Women

Many inside Congress are comfortable with the role of women in the military and would be reluctant to consider it as weighty as strategy and space concerns. There are some, on the other hand, who verbally and persuasively urge action on this issue. It, like the issues that follow, are gaining momentum.

Congress has not considered the issue of women's role in the military since the 1970s. (68:9) Senators Cohen and Proxmire introduced legislation in 1987 to open all combat support positions to women because of the declining pool of young men in the 1990s and because "polls show the U.S. public supports wider utilization of women." (68:9) Senator Cohen said he believes women will be allowed in direct combat "after a period of education, trial and error, and evolution" and that

all reconnaissance, training, and transport aircraft should be open to them. (69:12)

There is wide support for such a measure since it provides equal opportunity without sending women into direct combat--"direct combat assignments for women are prohibited by law." (70:4)

Senator DeConcini proposed another bill in 1987 to make Air Force women eligible for fighter pilot training. Though the bill would not permit them to participate in combat missions, it would allow them to use their skills to train other qualified pilots. (71:1)

Such legislation is indicative of the direction Congress is moving on the role of women in the Air Force.

Futuristic Trends

Several relatively recent technological developments have caught Congress' attention. The growth of computer power and microelectronic capacity will change the way of doing business and, most likely, congressional oversight of how DoD manages their applications of both. (20:7) Already, Congress is "micromanaging key electronics programs..." because they are so critical to weapon system development. (39:112) One congressman said stealth technologies should be considered a universal concept and should be applied to reducing the visibility and radar, electronic, and heat signatures of headquarters and logistics systems. (59) He also wrote that "distance will evaporate as a limiting social factor when communication replaces transportation as the primary mode of

human interaction." (20:5) He thinks "the most powerful force changing our society is the information revolution. (20:68)

Congress is aware of trends in these areas and will, no doubt, watch closely how the Air Force deals with them.

Another area, the environment, is already at the top of their list of concerns.

Environment

A recent study (see Appendix 2) shows the importance of environmental issues to members of Congress. When they could talk about whatever they wanted to, in nearly one out of three cases, the militarily-related issues they talked about were environmental concerns. The trend toward cleaning up yesteryear's pollution and a concern about greenhouse gases will spill over into the military services. There is growing support for recycling, cleaner ground water, and forcing federal agencies (to include the military) to comply with the same regulations that govern civilian industry. This evolution can impact future basing decisions, aircraft maintenance and operations, and manpower levels. Congressional interest in the environment is significant and growing.

Educating Members of Congress

It is important to educate members of Congress. First, the number of them with any firsthand military experience is decreasing (see Figure 4) and they will only know what they learn through education. (2:39) Second, most want to learn. Representative Skelton said "...you're probably going backward

if you don't want to be better at what you do." (72:27) While he said this referring to military members, the same must be true for members of Congress. Third, individual members, particularly in the House, want to be included in the strategy-developing part of a game plan. One congressman said "DoD and the Administration would do much better if they would include the House..." instead of coming to them after the fact and asking for their support. (37:54,55) Fourth, "congressional supporters find presidential policy initiatives easier to promote if they can make the case that these initiatives sustain a broadly articulated national strategy and thereby serve the national interest." (30:66) Members are much more apt to support a position, policy, or weapon system if they have had ample opportunity to learn about the issue and where it fits into the larger scheme of national security. Secretary Rice acknowledged this when he "called on Congress to support (the Air Force) proposals for change in order to assure their success." (4:88) How well does Congress think the military does in the area of educating its members?

There is room for improvement. One congressman took one of the services to task for asking how it could improve its legislative liaison performance and then not doing what he had suggested. (37:52) Another congressman said,

There is no institutional framework in the military today for educating members of Congress. There are far more members of Congress who could be courted and educated than we currently get to because we have no system and pattern for doing it. (59)

Upon his retirement, Senator Goldwater advised the members of the Senate Armed Services Committee to "maintain a constant, informal liaison with the Pentagon. In other words, keep in touch, make field trips, get to know the enlisted people and the junior officers." (9:82) He realized that members of Congress, even members of the Armed Services Committee, need education. Congress wants to be educated and acknowledges its need to be.

CHAPTER VI

COMMON THREADS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In recent years, Congress has initiated and passed legislation of interest to the Air Force with neither its consent nor coordination. Additionally, Congress has expressed an increasing interest in a variety of other Air Force-related issues. The analysis of the foregoing chapters yields some common threads and and recommendations worthy of Air Force consideration and action respectively.

Common Threads

When considering the trends in congressionally-initiated policy changes relating to the Air Force, several threads that comprise the fabric of congressional action are apparent.

Congress does not have to have DoD or service support to enact legislation or make policy changes. While they usually prefer that support, they may proceed on their own without it. Witness the DoD reorganization, overhaul of senior officer PME, and assigning the drug interdiction mission to the military.

Congress strongly supports increased jointness to include interservice and interagency cooperation. As roles and missions are reevaluated within DoD, Congress will be watching if not "helping."

Third, many members are interested in learning more about how and why the military performs its mission. This presents new opportunities to each of the services.

Fourth, certain "facts of life" are unlikely to change. Legislative inertia and constituent interests have driven recent legislation and this trend will not diminish in the near future.

With these four common threads in mind, what can the Air Force do to improve the quality of national defense in general and defense-related legislation in particular?

Recommendations

With an understanding of Congress's interests and of what they are capable of doing without Air Force support, the Air Force should act on the following four recommendations.

First, the Air Force civilian and military leadership should pay closer attention to what members of Congress say and write. As a minimum, a bibliography of what selected key members (as a minimum) say and write should periodically be made available to those at and above wing commander level.

Second, DoD should take the lead in developing a formal educational program for members of Congress. This program should include an opportunity for selected members to

participate, as a minimum, in war games as national command authority players. Such a program would benefit both the member and the services. Additionally, understanding the unique needs and desires of individual members, up to three tracks could be developed for their education: one for new members, one for members with congressional experience, and one for members with military experience.

Third, the Air Force should reexamine its sacred cows--programs it has espoused or protected for years. The winds of change are blowing stronger now than ever in recent decades. Though the programs may have been well thought out at their inception, the premises on which they were built may have changed. If the Air Force does not reexamine these programs and policies, Congress will.

Fourth, the Air Force should take the lead in the space initiatives. This should include but not be limited to developing a joint doctrine for deploying new and using existing space assets for national security purposes.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Air Force needs to give closer attention to what Congress is thinking, saying, and doing. The recent history of Congress moving forward with legislation with or without military support shows no trend of slackening. This increases the importance of two realities. A military awareness of and response to the interests and intentions of Congress will improve the resulting legislation or direction.

Secondly, increasing the congressional understanding of national defense needs will further improve their output. Their education is critical to the perfecting of defense-related legislation. As the Air Force succeeds in doing these things, it will increase its ability to shape its future in support of the nation's defense.

APPENDIX 1

MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM

QUESTION: What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?

	Drug Abuse	Fear of War	Crime	Federal Budget Deficit	Unemploy- ment
Jan 85	2	27	4	16	20
May 85	6	23	4	6	21
Oct 85	3	20	3	16	24
Jan 86	2	30	3	11	18
Jul 86	8	22	3	13	23
Jan 87	10	23	3	10	16
Apr 87	11	23	3	13	13
Sep 88	11	5	2	12	9
May 89	27	2	6	7	6

P E R C E N T

Sources: (73:29;74:7;75:6,7;76:4,5)

APPENDIX 2

STUDY ON CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN AIR FORCE-RELATED ISSUES

1. SCOPE: Floor speeches, comments, debate, and extension of remarks in the House and Senate, 3 January to 27 April 1989 (the first 50 legislative days of the 101st Congress).
2. CRITERIA OF ISSUES OF INTEREST:
 - A. Excluded comments on appointments, confirmations, etc.
 - B. Focused on self-initiated legislation, current events, constituent interests, articles of note, trends, policy shortfalls, etc.
3. SUMMARY:

57 issues raised:

 - 32 percent (18) environmental
 - 25 percent (14) terrorism
 - 14 percent (8) drugs
 - 7 percent (4) national service
 - 23 percent (13) others: procurement reform, strategic defense initiative or space, defense spending, benefits, families, strategy, whistleblowing, weather equipment, Reserves
 - 101 percent total (due to rounding)
4. CONCLUSIONS:
 - A. Environmental concern is the highest, non-budget, congressionally-initiated, Air Force-related issue of interest.
 - B. Terrorism is the second highest issue of concern.
 - C. Concern for environment and terrorism exceeds all other issues combined.
 - D. Drugs and national service are number three and four respectively as issues of concern.
5. DATA: attached (pp. 55-60)

6. SOURCE DOCUMENTS:

- A. "Office of Legislative Liaison: Legislative Digest."
Prepared by the Office of Legislative Research
(SAF/LLR), Vol. 135, Nos. 1-50, 3 January-27 April
1989. (67)
 - B. Congressional Record, Vol. 135, Nos. 1-50, 3 January-27
April 1989. Washington: United States Government
Printing Office. (Attached data shows date, volume,
number, and page.)
7. ADMINISTRATION: Study conducted by Lt Col Loren M. Reno,
Air War College student, December 1989.

DATA FROM CONGRESSIONAL RECORD
3 January-27 April 1989

No.	Date	Page	(Subject)	(All volume 135)
-----	------	------	-----------	------------------

Remarks

ENVIRONMENT

- | | | | | |
|----|--------|----------|---|--|
| 5 | 24 Jan | E170 | Rep Gejdenson introduced a bill to "solve ground water contamination problem" | |
| 6 | 25 Jan | S575-78 | Sen Gore introduced a bill to establish a council to focus on policy responses to global environmental concerns: greenhouse effect, ozone layer | |
| 9 | 2 Feb | H165 | Rep Dingell introduced a bill to assure comprehensive cleanup of contamination resulting from release of hazardous substances at DOE facilities | |
| 9 | 2 Feb | S1069-84 | Sen Leahy introduced a bill to address emission of greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting chemicals | |
| 16 | 22 Feb | H327 | Rep Eckart introduced a bill: all Federal facilities to comply with same environmental standards major corporations, state and local governments do | |
| 20 | 1 Mar | E579-80 | Rep Schneider cited hazardous waste reduction importance | |
| 20 | 1 Mar | S1911 | Sen Simpson said clean air is critical national issue for him | |
| 20 | 1 Mar | E579-80 | Rep Schneider: hazardous waste reduction emphasis | |

- 21 2 Mar S2018-21
Sen Chafee introduced a bill to reduce atmospheric pollution to protect stratosphere from ozone depletion
- 22 3 Mar S2147-48
Sen Lautenberg introduced a bill to authorize the Corps of Engineers to collect or remove debris from New York harbor which obstructs navigation (S. 506)
- 23 6 Mar E657-59
Rep Hockbrueckner introduced a bill to provide comprehensive Federal recycling program
- 24 7 Mar S2211
Sen Reid said current laws protect manufacturer more than workers in aerospace industry from toxic materials
- 29 15 Mar H656
Rep Wolpe introduced a bill to prevent toxic waste pollution at the industrial source
- 30 16 Mar S2896-01
Sen Wirth introduced joint resolution to promote reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and ozone depletion
- 31 17 Mar S3036-38
Sen McCain introduced a bill to address the environmental danger in depleting the ozone layer
- 31 17 Mar S3137-45
Sen Baucus introduced a bill to prohibit chlorofluorocarbons and control emission of carbon dioxide and methane
- 37 4 Apr S3220
Sen Stevens criticized plan to contain Exxon oil spill in Alaska
- 40 7 Apr S3496-97
Sen Reid to introduce legislation denying tax deduction to firms for cost to cleaning up environmental damage

TERRORISM

- 6 25 Jan S137
Sen Cohen commended the Secretary of the Army for supporting counterterrorist capabilities within DoD
- 7 27 Jan E183-85
Rep Broomfield cited Qadhafi's continuing support for terrorism

- 9 2 Feb S1106-07
Sen Kerry introduced a bill to combat international terrorism by limiting arms export to terrorist-supporting nations
- 13 8 Feb S1294-95
Also S1303-04 and S1394-95. Three senators speak against terrorism
- 20 1 Mar H473-74
Two representatives discuss attack on House floor 35 years ago
- 29 15 Mar S2538-39
Sen Specter encouraged not dealing with terrorists like the PLO but bringing them to trial in the U.S.
- 29 15 Mar E795-96
Rep Gilman presentation to members of European Parliament and the House of Representatives was on terrorism and international narcotics problem
- 30 16 Mar H704-05
Several members called for continued U.S. efforts for free Terry Anderson and the other hostages
- 32 20 Mar E861
Rep Schneider reminded colleagues of nine American hostages still held in Lebanon
- 33 22 Mar H728
Rep Roukema sympathetic to families of victims of Pan Am Flight 103
- 33 22 Mar E883-84
Rep Barton introduced a bill requiring secretary of state to update Congress on countries that support terrorism
- 35 23 Mar H892
Rep Gilman plus two others commented on 10 American hostages in the Middle East
- 37 4 Apr S3222-23
Sen Moynihan commented on Anderson (hostage) and urged more release action
- 42 11 Apr S3672-73
Sen McCain urging caution in naming military members involved in combat with terrorist states

DRUGS

- 1 3 Jan E39-40
Rep Bryant introduced a bill to expand the military role in interdicting drug interdiction

- 6 25 Jan S131
Sen Dixon wants Drug Czar in cabinet

- 6 25 Jan S394-96
Sen D'Amato revises posse comitatus to authorize more direct military involvement: arrest authority, more radar coverage

- 15 21 Feb E412
Rep Rangell wants Drug Czar in the cabinet

- 29 15 Mar E795-96
Rep Gilman presentation to Members of European Parliament and Members of the House of Representatives were on terrorism and international narcotics problem

- 31 17 Mar S3006-07
Sen Coats pleased U.S. to have "secretary of defense who is willing to do everything within his power to contribute to the war on drugs

- 37 4 Apr S3224-26
Sen Moynihan cited group's report recommending 60 percent of efforts to reduce demand, 40 percent to reduce supply

- 43 12 Apr S3775-76
Sen Kerry introduced bills to develop strategy for international cooperation in the drug war

NATIONAL SERVICE

- 6 25 Jan S185-87
Sen Nunn introduced a bill to expand Federal support for volunteers in military or civilian service

- 7 27 Jan H107
Rep McCurdy introduced a bill: benefits to domestic and military volunteers (companion to Sen Nunn's)

- 15 21 Feb E419
Rep Penny voiced support of Rep McCurdy's bill

- 44 13 Apr S3918-19
Sen McCain introduced a bill: voluntary military of community service for educational benefits or home ownership

OTHERS

- 6 25 Jan S279-83 PROCUREMENT REFORM
Sen Levin and seven others introduced Whistleblower Protection Act
- 17 23 Feb S1643-47 PROCUREMENT REFORM
Sen Roth introduced a bill to create Civilian Acquisition Agency in DoD
- 7 27 Jan E208 SDI and DEFENSE SPENDING
Rep Yatron's poll of constituents: 71 percent support continued SDI research, 41 percent early deployment, 17 percent increased defense spending, 32 percent decreased defense spending
- 29 15 Mar H655-56 SPACE
Rep Buechner's H. Con Res 74 reaffirming the commitment to making the civil space program a national priority
- 12 7 Feb H204 BENEFITS
Rep Pickett recommended rejecting pilot program of user fees at military hospitals for non-active duty member
- 25 8 Mar H550 HEALTH CARE and BENEFITS
Rep Bustamante introduced a bill prohibiting charging user fees for outpatient care at military hospitals
- 30 16 Mar S2954-55 ROTC and STRATEGY
Sen Durenberger's summary of Rep Skelton speech: importance of training future officers in strategy and military history
- 42 11 Apr E1160-63 STRATEGY
Rep Skelton citing General Galvin's article on promoting strategic thinking and his panel's recommendation to encourage it at military war colleges
- 27 13 Mar E737-38 FAMILY
Recent Rep Schroeder book: defense budget is place we can find money for family initiatives
- 33 22 Mar H740-54 WHISTLEBLOWER
Four members supporting bill that adds protection for and encourages Federal employees who blow whistle on fraud, waste, and abuse (Plus six more members)

- 34 22 Mar E934-35 WEATHER
Rep Price thinks the National Weather Service needs
modernizing so as to be able to predict tornadoes
- 43 12 Apr E1175 RESERVES
Rep Bates submitted former Navy Secretary Lehman's article
recommending shifting up to one-third of the full time
regular forces to the Ready Reserves

APPENDIX 3

CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS

QUESTION: I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one--a great deal, quite a lot, some or very little.

(Percent saying "great deal" or "quite a lot")

	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
Military	61	63	61	58	63
Church/Organ- ized Religion	66	57	61	59	52
U.S. Supreme Court	56	54	52	56	46
Public Schools	48	49	50	49	43
Banks	51	49	51	49	42
Congress	(If included in the year's poll, these five varied from a high of 41 percent to a low of 25 percent.)				
Newspapers					
Television					
Organized Labor					
Big Business					

Source: (77:21)

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Hunzer, Elias. The Purse and the Sword. Ithica, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950, pp.21, 22.
2. Black, Frederick H. "The Military and Today's Congress." Parameters, Vol. XVII, No. 4, December 1987, pp. 37-48.
3. Gibson, Edward B., Jr. The Role of Congress in Naval Aviation Affairs. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air War College, 1953.
4. "Making the Best of It." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 11, November 1989, pp. 86-89.
5. U.S., Congress, Senate, Senators Goldwater, Cohen, and Nunn speaking in support of H.R. 3622, 99th Cong., 2d sess., 16 September 1986, Congressional Record 121:12,652-56.
6. U.S. Congress. Senate. Defense Organization: The Need for Change, S. Doc. No. 99-86, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 16 October 1985.
7. Public Law 99-433. "Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 1 October 1986." Congressional Information Service (CIS) Annual 1986, Legislative Histories of U.S. Public Laws. Washington D.C.: CIS, Inc., 1987, pp. 245-252.
8. Prina, L. Edgar. "Reorganization and Reality; the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Pitfalls and Promises." Sea Power, Vol. 30, No. 1, January 1987, pp. 19-23.
9. Ulsamer, Edgar. "Goldwater's Parting Shot." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 70, No. 2, February 1987, pp. 78-82.
10. Klick, Arnold F. "Formulation of Strategy." National Defense, Vol. LXXI, No. 428, May-June 1987, pp. 74-82.
11. Glick, Kenneth. "Hill's Acquisition Role said Area of 'Concern.'" Air Force Times, 6 July 1987, p. 18.
12. Maze, Rick. "Senate Approves Easing Joint-Duty Rules." Air Force Times, 5 October 1987, p. 6.

13. Barrett, Archie D. Reappraising Defense Organization. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1983.
14. U.S., Congress, House, Representative Dickinson Paying Tribute to Representative Nichols, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 2 March 1989, Congressional Record 21:512-23.
15. Snider, Don M. "DoD Reorganization: Part 1, New Imperatives." Parameters, Vol. XVII, No. 3, November 1987, pp. 88-100.
16. Goldwater, Senator Barry. "Overdose of Oversight and Lawless Legislating." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 124, No. 7, February 1987, pp. 54-56.
17. U.S Congress. House. Committee on Armed Services. Report of the Panel on Military Education of the 100th Congress. Committee Print, No. 4, 21 April 1989.
18. Morrow, Mark E. "HASC Report Says Nation's War Colleges Need Reorganization." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 126, No. 11, June 1989, p. 16.
19. Leatherman, Courtney. "Overhaul of Professional Military Colleges Weighed." The Chronicle of Higher Education, 15 March 1989, p. A24.
20. Gingrich, Newt. Window of Opportunity: A Blueprint for the Future. New York: Tom Doherty Associates, Inc., 1984.
21. Cavaiola, Lawrence J. "Congressional Watch, 1988." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 115/5/1035, May 1989, pp. 205-208.
22. Title XI--Drug Interdiction and Law Enforcement Support." Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 73, No. 1, January 1989, p. 28.
23. Pearle, Richard. "Playing Politics With U.S. Defenses." U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 105, No. 10, 12 September 1988, pp. 20-22.
24. Mann, Paul. "Congress Pressures Military To Assume Direct Antidrug Role." Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 128, No. 21, 23 May 1988.
25. U.S., Congress, House, Representative Bryant, Anti-Drug Act of 1987, 101st Cong., 1st sess., 3 January 1989, Congressional Record 1:E39-40.

26. Rasor, Dina. "Passing the Pork: The Pentagon's Blueprint for Lobbying Congress." The Washington Monthly, Vol. 17, No. 11, December 1985, pp. 25-31.
27. Fitzgerald, Randy. "This Congressman Beat the System." Reader's Digest, Vol. 134, No. 804, April 1989, p. 125-128.
28. Griffiths, Dave. "How Pork Barrel Politics Are Blunting Defense Cuts." Business Week, 15 September 1986, p. 90.
29. Rivlin, Alice M. "Systematic Analysis of Defense Issues: The Role of Congress." Naval War College Review, Vol. XLI, No. 4, Autumn 1988, pp. 6-14.
30. Walker, Wallace Earl. "Congressional Resurgence and the Destabilization of U.S. Foreign Policy." Parameters, Vol. XVIII, No. 3, September 1988, pp. 54-67.
31. Willis, Grant. "Leaders Fault Congress for Military Shortcomings." Air Force Times, 28 September 1987, p. 10.
32. Lindsay, James M. "Congress and Defense Policy: 1961 to 1986." Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 13, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 371-401.
33. Tucker, Phillip E. Congressional Perspectives on Trends and Issues Affecting National Security. Washington: National War College, March 1985.
34. Mann, Paul. "Congress Saddled With Years of Tough Defense Decisions." Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 128, No. 11, 14 March 1988, pp. 63-67.
35. Morrow, Mark E. "Congress Finds New Ways to Micromanage FY90 Budget." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 127, No. 4, November 1989, pp. 8-12.
36. Morrow, Mark E. "FY90-91 Budget Indicates Shifting Congressional Priorities." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 127, No. 2, September 1989, pp. 11-12.
37. Ganley, Michael and Benjamin F. Schemmer. "An Exclusive AFJ Interview with Representative William L. Dickinson." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 124, No. 8, March 1987, pp. 50-55.
38. Schroeder, Pat. Champion of the Great American Family. New York: Random House, 1989.

39. Cordesman, Anthony H. "The Final US FY1987 Defense Budget: The Congress Takes Over From Reagan." Armed Forces, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 1987, pp. 110-113.
40. Morrow, Mark E. "DoD/Congress Relations Will Improve in '90s, Say Congressmen and Experts." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 127, No. 5, December 1989, pp. 9-14.
41. Green Brian. "Dickinson on Defense." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 71, No. 8, August 1988, pp. 100-102.
42. Green, Brian. "Chappell's Pragmatic Strategy." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 70, No. 3, March 1987, pp. 114-117.
43. Maze, Rick. "Bill OK'd by House Panel Would Slow Promotions." Air Force Times, 9 November 1987, pp. 1, 28.
44. Morrow, Mark E. and Benjamin F. Schemmer. "An Exclusive Interview with Senator Warren B. Rudman." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 126, No. 10, May 1989, pp. 42-46.
45. Maze, Rick. "Sen. John Glenn: Champion of the Services--or Their Enemy." Air Force Times, January 1990, pp. 8, 10.
46. Pillsbury, Howard B., Jr. "Raising the Armed Forces." Armed Forces and Society, Vol. 14, No. 1, Fall 1987, pp. 65-84.
47. Ferrey, Marie E. "Vietnam Vets Continue Fight As Lawmakers." Air Force Times, 2 November 1987, p. 12.
48. Baumgarner, Fred. Chief, Legislative Research Office, Office of Legislative Liaison, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, Pentagon, Washington D.C. Interview. 16 February 1990.
49. Nunn, Sam. The Need to Reshape Military Strategy. Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1983.
50. Record, Jeffrey. Revising U.S. Military Strategy. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1984.
51. Correll, John T. "Back Through the Wringer." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 4, Apr ' 1989, pp. 34-39.
52. "Senator James R. Sasser Spe ' , Out." National Guard. Vol. XLII, No. 9, September 1988, pp. 36-40.

53. Stennis, John C. and J. William Fullbright. The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy. Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1971.
54. Deering, Christopher J. "Congress, the President, and Military Policy." The Annals of The American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 499, September 1988, pp. 136-147.
55. Schemmer, Benjamin F. "Airlift, Sealift in Short Supply at Very Time Need Grows Fastest." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 126, No. 10, May 1989, pp. 66-68.
56. Gordon, Michael R. "Legislation Backs U.S. Troop Cuts in Europe." New York Times, 3 March 1989, p. A12.
57. Mann, Paul. "Congress Continues Drive for Procurement Reform." Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 125, No. 18, 3 November 1986, pp. 36, 37.
58. Green Brian. "Capitol Hill." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 72, No. 11, November 1989, p. 20.
59. Gingrich, Newt. Speech Delivered to the Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1 September 1989.
60. Tolchin, Martin. "Study Warns on Military Superiority." The New York Times, 17 May 1989, p. D7.
61. "Senator Pushes Bill to Restore Military Draft." Air Force Times, 23 February 1987, p. 11.
62. "Representative G. V. 'Sonny' Montgomery Speaks Out." National Guard, Vol. XLIII, No. 7, July 1989, pp. 18-21.
63. "Fashioning a Hit List." U.S. News and World Report, Vol. 105, No. 4, July 25, 1988, p. 8.
64. "Biting the Bullet." Time, 25 July 1988, p.34.
65. Malishenko, Timothy P. "Congressional Dynamics of the Military Reform Caucus." National Contract Management Journal, Vol. 1, Issue 1, January 1987, pp. 23-33.
66. "Congress Orders Major Shift In SDI Priorities." Aviation Week and Space Technology, Vol. 129, No. 4, 25 July 1988, p. 21.
67. Office of Legislative Liaison: Legislative Digest, Prepared by the Office of Legislative Research (SAF/LLR), Vol. 135, Nos 1-50, 3 January-27 April 1989.

68. Young, Sharon B. "Senators Try to Open Combat Support to Women." Air Force Times, 9 March 1987, p. 9.
69. Young, Sharon B. "Senators: Women's Ability in Combat Proven." Air Force Times, 23 March 1987, p. 12.
70. Maze, Rick. "Combat Role For Women Gains Key Backer." Air Force Times, 13 July 1987, p. 4.
71. Dalton, Pat. "Senator Urges Fighter Training For Women." Air Force Times, 13 July 1987, pp. 1, 4.
72. Schad, Sgt Dave. "Legislative Branch: The People's Power." Soldiers, Vol. 42, No. 9, September 1987, pp. 25-27.
73. "Most Important Problem." The Gallup Report, No. 252, September 1986, pp. 28, 29.
74. "Most Important Problem." The Gallup Report, No. 260, May 1987, pp. 6, 7.
75. "Most Important Problem." The Gallup Report, No. 277, October 1988, pp. 6, 7.
76. "Most Important Problem." The Gallup Report, No. 285, June 1989, pp. 4, 5.
77. "Confidence In Institutions--Trend." The Gallup Report, No. 288, September 1989, p. 20, 21.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ault, Capt Frank W. "Capitol Hill and Pentagon Face Off On Drug War." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 126, No. 4, November 1988, pp. 60-62.
- Budahn, P. J. "Service Chiefs Air Complaints About Reorganization." Air Force Times, 8 June 1987, p. 10.
- "Confidence In Institutions--Trend." The Gallup Report, No. 263, August 1987, pp. 3, 5.
- Corddry, Charles W. "The Chairmen Size It Up." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 73, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 28-36.
- Davis, Lt Col Richard L. "The Case for Officer Professional Military Education." Airpower Journal, Vol. III, No. 4, Winter 1989, pp. 34-45.
- Ginovsky, John. "Departing Air Force Official Condemns Congress." Air Force Times, 12 September 1988, p. 8.
- Ginovsky, John. "Education Overhaul to Resume." Air Force Times, 1 January 1990, p. 12.
- Halloran, Richard. "War College Turns Again To War." The New York Times, 28 January 1986, pp. C-1, C-10.
- Hansen, Jake. "U.S. Political Report: Above the Law? Congress Expands Its Powers." Defense and Foreign Affairs, April 1989, pp. 34-35.
- Isaacs, John. "Congress and the Military Revisited." Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, February 1986, pp. 6, 7.
- Johnson, Sharen Shaw. "Women in Combat: The Battle Moves to Congress." USA Today, Vol. 8, No. 91, 24 January 1990, pp. 1, 2A.
- Krepinevich, Andrew F., Jr. The Army and Vietnam. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- Larrabee, F. Stephen. "Gorbachev and the Soviet Military." Foreign Affairs, Vol. 66, No. 5, Summer 1988, pp. 1002-1026.

- Linsley, Clyde. "The Go-Betweens." Government Executive, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 1989, p. 20-25.
- Matthews, William. "GAO Warns Reserves May Not Be There When Needed." Air Force Times, 5 February 1990, p. 8.
- Morrow, Mark E. "Congressional, White House Budget Estimates Avoid Funding Issue." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 127, No. 3, October 1989, pp. 9-12.
- "Most Urgent Health Problem." The Gallup Report, Nos. 268/269, January/February 1988, p. 43.
- Pearle, Richard. "Statement Before the Committee on Armed Service, United States Senate." 24 January 1990.
- Prohaska, Elmer G. The Role of Congress in Military Matters. Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, February 1953.
- "Saving Fort Pork Barrel." Time, 18 July 1988, p. 29.
- Skelton, Representative Ike. "Military Education: Future's Foundation." ROA National Security Report, Vol. 8, No. 1, January 1990, pp. 12-16.
- Slavin, Peter. "Side by Side." Air Force Times, 29 January 1990, pp. 45, 52, 53, 56.
- "Subcommittee Membership for the 101st Congress." Armed Forces Journal International, Vol. 126, No. 8, March 89, p. 14.
- Towell, Pat. "The Pentagon vs. Congress." Air Force Magazine, Vol. 73, No. 2, February 1990, pp. 40-45.
- Wunderlich, Rob. "Interpreting the ABM Treaty: Should the Senate Get the Information It Needs." Journal of Defense and Diplomacy, Vol. 5, No. 12, December 1987, pp. 4-5.